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Principles and Other Emerging Paradigms
in Bioethics
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP*
If a history of recent biomedical ethics were written, it would encompass
several disciplines, including the health professions, law, biology, the social
and behavioral sciences, theology, and philosophy. Principles understood with
relative ease by the members of these disciplines figured prominently in the
development of biomedical ethics during the 1970's and early 1980's.
Principles were used primarily to present frameworks of evaluative assump-
tions or general premises underlying positions and conclusions.' However,
beginning in the mid-1980's, the paradigm of a system of principles began to
be aggressively challenged. Several alternatives have since been proposed,
including revivals of casuistry and virtue theory. These developments should
be welcomed in bioethics because they have improved the range, precision,
and quality of thought in the field. However, the various proposed alternative
approaches do not replace principles if "replacement" means displacement in
the way Thomas Kuhn used the language of one paradigm displacing another.
The leading alternatives are thoroughly compatible with a paradigm of
principles. Indeed, they are mutually supportive.
I will begin my argument to this conclusion by outlining the nature of a
principle-based approach to ethics, concentrating on the book James Childress
and I wrote in the mid-1970's entitled Principles of Biomedical Ethics. After
sketching our ethical framework, Part I will point to some limitations of the
model and indicate how those limitations should be handled. Finally, Part II
will consider the nature and limits of three proposed alternatives to a
principle-based approach.
I. PRINCIPLES AS A STARTING POINT
Principle-based ethical theories emphasize impartial moral obligations, but
"principles" should not be defined in terms of obligations. Moral principles
are simply relatively general norms of conduct that describe obligations,
* Kennedy Institute of Ethics and Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University.
1. For example, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects struggled with
principles from 1974 to 1978 because of a mandate from the U.S. Congress requiring that the
Commission investigate the ethics of research and explore the "basic ethical principles" of research
ethics. The Commission ultimately developed an abstract schema of basic principles related to the
subject areas of research ethics to which they primarily apply:
Principle of applies to Guidelines for
Respect for Persons Informed Consent
Beneficence Risk/Benefit Assessment
Justice Selection of Subjects
In light of this schema, a general strategy was devised for handling problems of research ethics. See
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT (No. OS 78-0012, 1978).
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permissible actions, and ideals of action. A principle is a regulative guideline
stating conditions of the permissibility, obligatoriness, rightness, or aspira-
tional quality of actions falling within the scope of the principle. If principles
are adequately expressed, relatively more particular moral rules and judgments
are supported by, though not deduced from, the principles. For example,
principles of justice provide support for particular rules and judgments
regarding equal treatment, fair taxation, and just compensation.
I will not sharply distinguish between rules and principles in my arguments.
Both are action guides, but rules are more specific and restricted in scope. In
addition to substantive rules of truthtelling, confidentiality, privacy, fidelity,
etc., authority rules concern who may perform and who should perform
actions, including rules of surrogate authority, rules of professional authority,
and rules of distributional authority that determine who should make decisions
about the allocation of scarce medical resources. Procedural rules are also
important in bioethics because they establish procedures to follow, such as
procedures for determining eligibility for scarce medical resources. Principles
are more abstract, leaving considerable room for judgment about individual
cases and policies. This property is no imperfection in principles. We simply
must take responsibility for the way we bring principles to bear in our
judgments about particular cases and in the development of policies. Rules are
not always available to do this work for us.
A. A Principle-Based Paradigm
Childress and I defend what has sometimes been called the four-principles
paradigm of biomedical ethics. Our paradigm is that various principles worthy
of acceptance in bioethics can be grouped under four general categories, viz.:
(1) respect for autonomy (a principle of respect for the decision-making
capacities of autonomous persons); (2) nonmaleficence (a principle of
avoiding the causation of harm to others); (3) beneficence (a group of
principles for providing benefits and balancing benefits against risks and
costs); and (4) justice (a group of principles for fairly distributing benefits,
risks, and costs).
These principles, insofar as they assert obligations (but not insofar as they
are used to frame ideals), should be conceived neither as so weak that they
are mere rules of thumb nor as so strong that they assert absolute require-
ments. They are firm obligations that can be set aside only if they come into
conflict with and do not override another obligation. In cases of a conflict of
obligations, either obligation then has the potential to release the person from
the other obligation. Often some balance between two or more norms must be
found that requires some part of each obligation to be discharged, but in many
cases one simply overrides the other.
This overriding of one obligation by another seems precariously flexible to
some, as if moral guidelines in the end lack backbone and can be magically
waived away as not real obligations. But in ethics, as in all disciplines that
confront principled conflicts, such as law, there is no escape from the exercise
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of judgment in resolving the conflicts. One function of principles is to keep
judgments principled without removing agent discretion. As long as an agent
does not stray beyond the demands of principles, it cannot be said that
judgments are arbitrary or unprincipled, even when one principle overrides
another.
I do not mean to insist that every judgment to resolve principled conflicts
must itself be resolved by the principles in conflict-a manifestly false thesis.
The skillful use of principles itself requires judgments, which, in turn, depend
on character, moral insight, and a sense of personal responsibility and
integrity. These properties of persons are neither principles nor principled.
Very often sensitive, prudent, or judicious decisions are made that cannot
easily be described as "principled." However, the resolution of principled
conflicts will frequently appeal to (1) one or more external principles; (2) a
procedure; (3) a form of authority; (4) a balancing of principles; or (5) a
specification of the principles in conflict. If a procedure or an authority is the
best resource, this will be determined by principles that point to the procedure
or authority so that principles will be integrally involved in each of these five
forms of appeal.
In these circumstances we often need latitude to weigh alternatives in a
circumstance of conflict, leaving room for negotiation and compromise. This
is especially true in a situation of moral controversy. But even negotiation and
compromise can follow the path of (l)-(5), and so need not be unprincipled.
For example, in many difficult circumstances, two or more morally acceptable
alternatives are unavoidably in conflict because both present good reasons for
action. That is, both present good but not decisive or solely sufficient reasons.
In the event of such a confrontation between principles, the best course is
often to further specify the precise commitments of principles. Such action
will be explained below when discussing specification.
B. Sources of Principles
The four categories of principles mentioned above are drawn from the
common morality. By "the common morality" I mean the morality that all
reasonable persons share and acknowledge-common sense ethics, as it is
sometimes called. Its norms are based on social conventions and historical
traditions rather than philosophical systems that appeal to pure reason, natural
law, intuition, and the like. A substantial social consensus exists about general
principles and rules in the common morality, far more consensus than exists
about general norms in philosophical ethical theories. From this perspective,
a paradigm of philosophical theory or method should be resisted if it cannot
be made coherent with preexistent cultural understandings of what John Rawls
calls our considered judgments. That is, those moral convictions in which we
have the highest confidence and believe to have the lowest level of bias, such
as principles that prohibit racial discrimination, religious intolerance, and
political favoritism.
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In biomedical ethics, traditional health care contexts often supply more
specific moral content, typically in the form of role responsibilities. These
traditions supply an understanding of obligations and virtues as they have
been adapted over the centuries for professional practice. The health
professional's obligations, rights, and virtues have long been framed primarily
as professional commitments to shield patients from harm and provide medical
care-fundamental obligations of nonmaleficence and beneficence. Profession-
al dedication to these norms has been part of the self-understanding of
physicians. For example, physicians have traditionally taken the view that
disclosing certain forms of information from patient records can cause harm
to patients under their care and that medical ethics obligates them to maintain
confidentiality.
The principle of nonmaleficence provides perhaps the best example of a
traditional principle in biomedical ethics. This principle has long been
associated in medicine with the injunction primum non nocere: "Above all [or
first] do no harm," a maxim often mistakenly attributed to the Hippocratic
tradition.2 It has an equally prestigious position in the history of moral
philosophy. John Stuart Mill, for example, praised the moral rules of
nonmaleficence as "that which alone preserves peace among human beings."3
British physician Thomas Percival furnished the first developed account of
health care ethics, in which he maintained that principles of nonmaleficence
and beneficence fix the physician's primary obligations and triumph even over
the patient's autonomy rights in a circumstance of potential harm to patients:
To a patient ... who makes inquiries which, if faithfully answered, might
prove fatal to him, it would be a gross and unfeeling wrong to reveal the
truth. His right to it is suspended, and even annihilated; because, its
beneficial nature being reversed, it would be deeply injurious to himself,
to his family, and to the public. And he has the strongest claim, from the
trust reposed in his physician, as well as from the common principles of
humanity, to be guarded against whatever would be detrimental to him.4
Like the Hippocratics, Percival accepted as the first principle of medical
ethics that the patient's best medical interest rightly determines the physi-
cian's obligations. He conceived the central virtues of the physician through
models of benevolence and sympathetic tenderness, as they serve to promote
the patient's welfare.
Recently, the idea has flourished in biomedical ethics that the physician's
moral responsibility should be understood less in terms of traditional ideals
of medical benefit and more in terms of the patients' rights of self-determina-
tion. These rights include the right to truthful disclosure, confidentiality,
2. Albert R. Jonsen, Do No Harm: Axiom of Medical Ethics, in PHILOSOPHICAL AND MEDICAL
ETHICS: ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 27-41 (Stuart F. Spicker & H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. eds.,
1977).
3. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL Ch. 5
(1969).
4. THOMAS PERCIVAL, MEDICAL ETHICS; OR A CODE OF INSTITUTES AND PRECEPTS, ADAPTED TO
THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 165-66 (1803). Percival's work served
as the pattern for the American Medical Association's (AMA) first code of ethics in 1847.
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privacy, and consent, as well as welfare rights rooted in claims of justice.
These proposals have moved medical ethics from its traditional preoccupation
with a patient-welfare model toward an autonomy model of the care of
patient, while also confronting the field with a wider set of social concerns,
such as the right to health care. For this reason, principles of autonormy and
justice have increased in importance.
The justification for choosing the particular four groups of principles
Childress and I defend is therefore partially historical (based on medical
traditions of health care ethics) and partially of contemporary origin, in the
context of which principles of autonomy and justice point to an important
aspect of morality that was traditionally neglected in health care ethics.
C. The Need for Additional Specification of Principles
To say that principles have their origins in and find support in the common
morality and in traditions of health care is not to say that their definitive
appearance in an ethical theory or in a developed paradigm of biomedical
ethics is identical to their appearance in the traditions from which they spring.
Conceptual clarification and attempts to increase coherence give shape and
substance to principles, much as judges in their opinions express and develop
the commitments of legal precedents and principles of law for the cases
before them.
Every ethical theory (as well as the common morality) contains regions of
indeterminacy that need reduction through further development of norms in
the system, augmenting them with a more specific moral content. In light of
the indeterminacy found in principles and all general norms, I follow Henry
Richardson in arguing that the specification of norms involves filling in
details in order to overcome moral conflicts and the incompleteness of
principles and rules.5 Specification is the progressive, substantive delineation
of principles and rules, pulling them out of their abstractness and giving them
a more specific and practical content. Because principles are stated at a lofty
level of abstraction, little practical content can be drawn directly from the
principles, and that content is still subject to competing interpretations. More
precision through specification is therefore essential for regulative and
decision-making contexts.
Principles are not so much applied as they are explicated and made suitable
for specific tasks, typically by developing policies. Judgment and decision-
making are essential for this interpretive process. For this reason, philosophers
like John Mackie rightly argue that ethics is "invented." Mackie does not
mean that individuals create personal moral policies, but that "intersubjective
standards" are built up over time through communal agreements and decision-
making. What is morally demanded, enforced, and condemned is less a matter
5. Henry S. Richardson, Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical Problems, 19
PHIL. PUB. Asr. 279 (1990).
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of what we discover in already available basic principles and more a matter
of what we decide by reference to and in development of those principles.
As a simple example of specification and "invention" in this sense, consider
conflicts of obligation that emerge from the dual roles of research scientist
and clinical practitioner. As an investigator, the physician has an obligation
to generate scientific knowledge that will benefitfuture patients. As a clinical
practitioner, the physician has obligations of care that require acting in the
best interests of present patients. The very notion of physician-as-scientist
suggests two roles that pull in different directions, each role having its own
specifiable set of obligations. How, then, do we make these various
obligations more precise, specific, and coherent when they come into conflict?
One possibility is to segregate the roles so that they cannot conflict, for
example, specifying that physicians with clinical responsibilities cannot use
their own patients when discharging research responsibilities. This formulation
is an "invention" specifying that a physician's obligations of beneficence to
patients must not be confounded or compromised by research obligations. This
specification will solve some problems about the dual role, but it will leave
others unresolved and in need of additional inventiveness and specification.
Suppose, for example, that it is in everyone's best interest in some circum-
stances for a set of physicians to assume both roles despite the conflicts of
interest that will occur for these physicians. We might then specify that
"physicians can simultaneously accept clinical and research obligations for the
same patients only if a full disclosure is made to the patients of the dual role
and of any conflicts of interest present in the dual role." This specification
attempts to make the obligations jointly acceptable by adding disclosure
obligations that did not previously exist.
Such specifications will involve at times a balancing of principles, at times
an appending of additional obligations, and at other times a development of
one or more principles by making them more precise for purposes of policy.
In all of these ways, we become more specific and practical while retaining
fidelity to our original principle(s). This strategy has the advantage of
allowing, us to unpack our evaluative commitments and to expand them as
well, presumably achieving a more workable and a more coherent body of
contextually relevant norms. Of course, many already specified norms will
need further specification as new or unanticipated circumstances arise. All
moral norms are potentially subject to this process of further inventive
revision and specification. Progressive specification usually should occur in
practical settings, gradually reducing circumstances of conflict and insufficien-
cy of content.7
There are, of course, tangled problems about the best method for achieving
specification and about how tojustify a proposed specification; specification,
however, not merely a bare appeal to principles and rules, is clearly needed.
6. Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED.
141 (1987).
7. Richardson, supra note 5, at 294.
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The analytic model for reaching specification and justification in health care
ethics that Childress and I have used involves a dialectical balancing of
principles against other moral considerations in an attempt to achieve general
coherence and a mutual support among the accepted norms. A now widely
accepted method of this general description that can be used for the
specification of principles is called "reflective equilibrium." This method
views the acceptance of principles as properly beginning with considered
judgments, but then as requiring a matching, pruning, and developing of
considered judgments and principles in an attempt to make them coherent.
Starting with paradigms of what is morally proper or morally improper, we
then search for specifications of principles that are consistent with these
paradigms and consistent with each other.8
A specified principle, then, is acceptable in a system of norms if it
heightens the mutual support of other norms in the system that have
themselves survived in reflective equilibrium. This understanding of the
principles paradigm assumes that no canonical content exists for bioethics.
There is no scripture, no authoritative interpretation of anything analogous to
scripture, and no authoritative interpretation of that large mass of judgments,
rules, standards of virtue, and the like that we often collectively sum up by
use of words such as "morality" or "bioethics." A principle-based account also
disavows models of a single ultimate principle of ethics and of absolute rules.
The principles approach supports a method of inventive content expansion into
more specific norms, not a system layered by priorities among rules or among
categories of ethics. From this perspective, principles are the background
framework, but also are the point at which the real work of policy develop-
ment and moral judgment begin.
II. ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS
Several alternative paradigms have arisen in recent years, some of whose
proponents have been sharply critical of principles. I will now consider three
such alternatives. Although my primary goal is to place criticisms of
principles in a proper perspective, I have a secondary goal as well. Critics
have often appropriately pointed to limits in the principles paradigm,
especially limits of scope, practicability, or justificatory power. Much can be
learned from this commentary about the points at which even carefully
specified principles are inadequate to provide a comprehensive understanding
of the moral life. Alternative paradigms usually exhibit their primary strength
at these points. In my assessments below, I maintain that these alternatives
can be made coherent with and therefore are not rivals of a principle-based
account.
8. This method was initially formulated by John Rawls for use in general ethical theory. JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20, 46-49, 195-201, 577 (1971).
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A. Casuistry as an Alternative Paradigm
"Casuistry," derived from the Latin casus for case, is a term now used
primarily to refer to a method of using cases to analyze and propose solutions
for moral problems. A casuist is one who is positioned to make recommenda-
tions about specific cases; thus, clinical bioethics is by its very nature
casuistical. But casuistry also usually refers to a specific method of analyzing
and generalizing from cases. The essence of the casuistical method is to start
with paradigm cases whose conclusions are settled, and then to compare and
contrast the central features in these settled cases with the features of cases
to be decided. Maxims drawn from past cases and specific analogies are used
to support recommendations for new cases. To use an analogy to case law and
the doctrine of precedent, when judicial decisions become authoritative, these
decisions have the potential to become authoritative for other judges
confronting similar cases in similar circumstances and with similar facts.
In casuistical ethics, moral authority proceeds from the settled paradigm
cases and maxims, but there are no rigid rules or principles because particular
circumstances and their features alter the way cases are handled and decided.
Just as case law (legal rules) develops incrementally from cases, so the moral
law (a set of moral rules) develops incrementally in casuistry.9 However,
these rules only pick out the salient features of cases and must be used with
caution and discernment. In clinical medical ethics, for example, prior cases
allow us to.focus by analogical reasoning on practical decision-making in new
cases, but, depending on their novel features, very different conclusions still
may be reached in the new cases. Characteristic features of contemporary
casuistry include this premium on case interpretation together with a strong
preference for analogical reasoning over theory.'
1. A Rejection of Principles and Theory
Several contemporary casuists are dissatisfied with principle-based theories,
especially in clinical contexts. The casuist views clinical medical ethics as a
discipline arising from clinical practice rather than from an application of
general ethical principles to cases." It is not always clear, however, why
contemporary casuists react as vigorously to principles as they often do. In the
great Latin traditions of casuistry emanating from Cicero, students were taught
9. See ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY 16-19, 66-67 (1988);
John D. Arras, Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 31-33
(1991); Albert Jonsen, Casuistry and Clinical Ethics, 7 THEORETICAL MED. 67, 71 (1986) [hereinafter
Jonsen, Clinical Ethics]; and Albert Jonsen, Casuistry as Methodology in Clinical Ethics, 12
THEORETICAL MED. 298 (1991) [hereinafter Jonsen, Casuistry as Methodology].
10. Cf. John D. Arms, Common Law Morality, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. July/Aug. 1990, at 5.
Arms makes the following constructive recommendations after criticizing casuistry: Use real and lengthy
cases, present complex sequences of cases that build on one another, and be cautious regarding the
limits of casuistical methods.
11. Cf. David C. Thomasma, Why Philosophers Should Offer Ethics Consultations, 12 THEORETICAL
MED. 129 (1991).
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how to use both principles and analogies from prior cases to propose
resolutions in a new case. Both Rabbinical and Roman common-law traditions
of casuistry continued this practice.
Although the sources of contemporary hostility to principles and theory are
difficult to pinpoint, we can briefly treat some mainstream objections. A first
reason is the close connection some casuists see between principles and
theory, particularly when theory is depicted by its proponents as a unified
theory with impartial and universal principles. The underlying aspiration of
such theories has been to emulate the natural sciences by locating what is
most general and universal in ethics, expressed in precise principles that enjoy
the high measure of confidence found in scientific principles. Casuists reject
this vision, holding that ethics is neither a science nor a theory fashioned
along the lines of traditional ethical theories such as utilitarianism and
Kantianism. Rather ethics is based on seasoned practices rooted in experi-
ence." Consider an analogy to the way a physician thinks when making a
diagnosis and then a recommendation to a patient. Many individual factors,
including the patient's medical history, the physician's successes with similar
patients, and paradigms of expected outcomes, will play a role in formulating
a judgment and recommendation to a patient. Such recommendation may be
very different from the recommendation that will be made to the next patient
with the same malady.
A second reason for hostility to principles is that moral philosophers have
typically regarded cases as merely a set of facts that illustrate principles and
exemplify problems, but lack all means to resolve the moral problems
presented by the cases. Casuists maintain, instead, that when reasoning
through cases, one sometimes legitimately finds that appeal to principles,
rules, rights, or virtues is not necessary. For example, when principles, rules,
or rights conflict, and appeals to higher principles, rules, or rights have been
exhausted, one still makes reasoned moral judgments. Here moral reasoning
invokes not principles, but narratives, paradigm cases, analogies, models,
classification schemes, and even immediate intuition and discerning insight. 3
Third, when principles are interpreted inflexibly, irrespective of the nuances
of cases, some casuists find the principles "tyrannical" on grounds that they
obstruct compromise and the resolution of moral problems by generating a
gridlock of conflicting principled stands. Moral debate then becomes
intemperate. Often this impasse can be avoided, from the casuists' perspec-
tive, only by focussing on points of agreement about cases, not on abstract
principles."
12. Although some casuists are critical of theory, others encourage principles and theory
construction. See BARUCH A. BRODY, LIFE AND DEATH DECISION MAKING 13 (1988). For a different
view, see Albert R. Jonsen, Practice Versus Theory, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. July-Aug. 1990, at 32,
32-34. Brody defends theory construction; Jonsen challenges the presumption that "theory is an
inseparable companion to practice" and opposes theory construction to practice and casuistry. Id. at 34.
13. See BRODY, supra note 12, at 12-13, 15; JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 9, at 11-19, 66-67,
251-54, 296-99; Arras, supra note 9, at 31-33; Jonsen, Clinical Ethics, supra note 9, at 67, 71; Jonsen,
Casuistry as Methodology, supra note 9, at 299-302.
14. See Stephen Toulmin, The Tyranny of Principles, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP. Dec. 1981, at 31.
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Fourth, casuists maintain that principles and rules are typically too
indeterminate to yield specific moral judgments (for reasons already discussed
above). It is therefore impossible, casuists insist, that there be a unidirectional
movement of thought from principles to cases. Indeed, specified principles
will assume an adequately determinate form only after reflection on particular
cases; the determinate content in practical principles will therefore at least in
part be fixed by reflection on cases.
Fifth, casuists argue that even carefully specified principles still must be
weighed and balanced in accordance with the demands and nuances of
particular circumstances. Interpreting, weighing, and balancing of principles
is essential whenever the particular features of cases cannot have been fully
anticipated by a prior process of specification. For example, a physician's
judgment about the decisions a particular patient should be encouraged to
make or discouraged from making is often influenced by how responsible the
physician thinks the patient is. Every case presents a person at a different
level of responsibility. So, again, a principle is less an applied instrument than
a part of a wider process of deliberation.
It does not follow from these five observations that casuists need be hostile
to all principles, but only that principles must be interpreted to be coherent
with the casuist's paradigm of moral reasoning. Reasonable casuists find the
gradual movement from paradigm cases to other cases to be an endeavor that
eventuates in principles, which in turn can be helpful in spotting the morally
relevant features in new cases. Cases can be ordered under a principle through
paradigm and then extended by analogy to new cases. As abstract generaliza-
tions, they help express the received learning derived from the struggle with
cases and capture the connections between cases. However, from the casuists'
perspective, principles, so understood, are merely summaries of our experi-
ence in reflecting on cases, not norms that are independent of cases.
2. Some Problems with Casuistry
Although much in these casuistical arguments is acceptable, proponents
have sometimes overstated the promise and output power of their account
while understating their reliance on theory and principles. Casuists often write
as if cases lead to moral paradigms, analogies, or judgments by their facts
alone. But, as the great classical casuists readily acknowledged, this premise
is dubious. The properties that one observes to be of moral importance in
cases are picked out by the values (and perhaps the theories) that one has
already accepted as being morally important. Consider the following fact
which one might discover in a case: "Person M cannot survive without person
S's bone marrow." What is the moral conclusion? Nothing, a casuist might
say, until one knows the full range of facts in the case. But no matter how
many facts are stacked one on top of the next, one will still need some sort
of value premise-for example, "everyone ought to help others survive
through bone marrow transplant donations" in order to reach a conclusion
such as, "S ought to donate his bone marrow." The value premise, which is
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a principle or rule, bridges the gap between factual premises and the clearly
evaluative conclusion. But, prior to adding this premise, it was not possible
to reach the conclusion. The casuist will face this same general problem in
every case.
Appeals to "paradigm cases" only mask this fact. Paradigm cases become
paradigms because of prior commitments to central values (and perhaps
theories) that are preserved from one case to the next case. Principles
typically play a legitimate role in determining the acceptability of what is
transferred from case to case. For the casuist to move constructively from
case to case, a norm of moral relevance must connect the cases. Rules of
relevant features across cases will not themselves be a part of the case, but.
a way of interpreting and linking cases. Even to recognize a case as a
paradigm case is to accept the principles or rules that allow the paradigms to
be extended to other cases.
Jonsen treats this problem by distinguishing descriptive elements in a case
from moral maxims that inform judgment about the case: "These maxims
provide the 'morals' of the story. For most cases of interest, there are several
morals, because several maxims seem to conflict. The work of casuistry is to
determine which maxim should rule the case and to what extent." 5 So
understood, casuistry presupposes principles (maxims or rules) and takes them
to be essential elements in moral reasoning. The principles are present prior
to the decision, and are then selected and weighed in the circumstances. This
is precisely the principles paradigm, not a rival paradigm.
Moral reasoning can here again be made analogous to legal reasoning in
courts: If a legal principle commits a judge to an unacceptable judgment, the
judge needs to modify or supplement the principle in a way that renders the
judge's beliefs about the law as coherent as possible. If a well-founded
principle demands a change in a particular judgment, the overriding claims of
consistency with precedent may require that the judgment be adjusted, rather
than the principle.' 6 Sometimes both judgments and principles need revision.
Either way, principles play a central role.
Casuists also have a problem with conflicting judgments that suggests a
need for principles. Cases are typically amenable to competing judgments, and
it is inadequate to be told that cases extend beyond themselves and evolve
into paradigms. Perhaps cases will evolve in disastrous ways because they
were improperly treated from the outset by a perilous analogy. Casuists have
no clear methodological resource to prevent a biased development of cases
and a neglect of relevant features of cases. This problem caused the decline
of casuistry after 1650, when it became increasingly evident that opposite
conclusions could be easily "justified" by competing casuistical forms of
argument. It was so-called "moral laxity" that destroyed classical casuistry.
The same laxity will doom contemporary casuistry unless it is fortified by
more stable principles.
15. Jonsen, Casuistry as Methodology, supra note 9, at 298 (emphasis added).
16. Cf JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 34 (1973).
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Finally, how does justification occur in casuistry? Given the many different
types of appeal that might be made in any given case (analogies, generaliza-
tions, character judgments, etc.), there apparently can be several different
"right" answers on any given occasion. This problem exists, of course, for
virtually all moral theories and is not a problem unique to casuistry. Without
a stable framework of norms, however, casuists leave too much room for
judgment and have too few resources to prevent prejudiced or poorly
formulated social conventions.
In the end, casuists seem ambivalent about principles. On the one hand,
casuists acknowledge a limited, conditional role. Jonsen explicitly says, "This
casuistic analysis does not deny the relevance of principle and theory."' 7 On
the other hand, casuists denounce firm and firmly held principles as tyrannical
and criticize appeals to principles as "moralistic" and "not a serious ethical
analysis."' 8 Proponents of casuistry seem most deeply concerned not about
a reasonable use of reasonable principles, but only about the excessive
reliance in recent philosophy on universal principles. ,It is, then, incorrect to
make an account based on principles an instant rival of casuistry. Casuists
rightly point to the gap that exists between principles and good decision-
making, but their own account will fall victim to the same charge if it leaves
a similar gap between cases and good decision-making.
B. Virtue Theory as an Alternative Paradigm
Recent ethical theory, including bioethics, has also returned to another
prominent classical paradigm: character and virtue as central moral catego-
ries. This paradigm has been exploited to pose a challenge to principle-based
theories, which typically attend to actions and obligations rather than agents
and their virtues. The language of principles and obligations, it is claimed,
descends from (rather than determines) virtue, character, and motives.' 9
Major writers in the virtue tradition have long held that, to cite an observation
of Hume's, "If a man have a lively sense of honour and virtue, with moderate
passions, his conduct will always be conformable to the rules of morality; or
if he depart from them, his return will be easy and expeditious."2 Various
writers in biomedical ethics have adopted this perspective. They argue that the
attempt in an obligation-oriented account to make principles, rules, codes, or
procedures paradigmatic will result in worse rather than better decisions and
actions because the only reliable protection against unacceptable ethical
behavior is virtuous character. 2' From this perspective, character is more
17. Albert R. Jonsen, Case Analysis in Clinical Ethics, I J. CLINICAL ETHICS 63, 65 (1990); see
also JONSEN & TOULMN, supra note 9, at 10.
18. Albert R. Jonsen, American Moralism and the Origin of Bioethics in the United States, 16 J.
MED. & PHIL. 113, 117, 125-28 (1991).
19. See PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES (1978); Gregory Trianosky, Supererogation,
Wrongdoing, and Vice: On the Autonomy of Ethics of Virtue, 83 J. PHIL. 26 (1986).
20. David Hume, The Sceptic, in ESSAYS 176 (Eugene Miller ed., 1987).
21. A classic treatment is Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1354 (1966). See also GREGORY E. PENCE, ETHICAL OPTIONS IN MEDICINE 177 (1980).
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important, both in institutions and in personal encounters, than conformity to
principles.
This line of argument has merit, but needs to be buttressed by a more
careful statement of the nature of the virtues and their connection to
principles. A moral virtue is a trait of character valued for moral reasons.
Virtue requires properly motivated dispositions and desires when performing
actions, and therefore is not reducible to acting in accordance with or for the
sake of principles of obligation. One cares morally about a person's
motivation, and particularly about characteristic forms of motivation. Persons
motivated by compassion and personal affection meet our approbation when
others who act the same way but from different motives would not. For
example, imagine a physician who meets all of her moral obligations but
whose underlying motives and desires are morally inappropriate. This
physician detests medical work and hates having to spend time with every
patient she encounters. This physician cares not at all about being of service
to people or creating a better environment in her office. She only wants to
make money and avoid malpractice suits. Although this person meets her
moral obligations, her character is deeply defective. The admirable compas-
sion guiding the lives of many dedicated health professionals is absent in this
person, who merely engages in following the socially required principles and
rules of behavior.
Properly motivated persons do not merely follow principles and rules; they
have a morally appropriate desire to act as they do. One can be disposed by
habit to do what is right in accordance with the demands of principles and yet
be inappropriately motivated. To speak of a good or virtuous action done from
principle is usually elliptical for an evaluation of the motive or desire
underlying the action.22 For example, if a person's act of benefiting another
person is to elicit moral praise, the person's motive must be to benefit; it
cannot be a motive such as the desire to be rewarded for supplying the
benefit. Right motive is essential for virtue, and a virtuous character is
constituted by an appropriate motive or motivational structure. Persons who
characteristically perform morally right actions from principles without a right
set of motives and desires are not morally virtuous, even if they always
perform the right action from the right principle.
This paradigm of the moral person succeeds in addressing the moral worth
of persons more adequately than does a principle-based theory of right action.
The paradigm appropriately indicates that virtue cannot be reduced to right
action in accordance with principles or rules. Kindness, for example, cannot
be reduced to a rule-structured action or precept, as if kindness were a matter
of following a recipe. Kindness is a disposition to treat people in certain ways
from specific motives and desires. We are often more concerned about these
motives and desires in persons than about the conformity of their acts to rules.
For example, when a physician takes care of us, we expect his or her actions
22. This formulation is indebted to DAVID HuME, A TREATISE OF'HUMAN NATuRE 478 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge ed., 1960) and JOHN L. MACKiE, HUME'S MORAL THEORY 79-80 (1980).
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to be motivated from a sense of principled obligation to us, but we expect
more as well. We expect the physician to have a desire to take care of us and
to want to maintain our hope and keep us from despair. The physician or
nurse who acts exclusively from principles may lack the virtue of caring that
is implied by the term "medical care." Absent this virtue, the physician or
nurse is morally deficient. Accordingly, to look at principled actions without
also looking at virtues is to miss a large segment of the moral life.
These arguments in defense of virtue ethics are entirely compelling, but
giving the virtues a central place in the moral life does not indicate that a
virtue-based paradigm should displace or take priority over a principle-based
paradigm. The two approaches have different emphases, but they can be
mutually reinforcing if one believes that ethical theory is richer and more
complete if the virtues are included. The virtue paradigm's strength rests in
the vital role played by the motivational structure of a virtuous person, which
often is as serviceable in guiding actions as are rules and principles. 3 But
the actions of persons with a virtuous character are not morally acceptable
merely because they are performed by a person of good character. People of
good character can perform improper actions because they have incorrect
information about consequences, make incorrect judgments, or fail to grasp
what they ought to do. People sometimes cannot evaluate a motive, a moral
emotion, or a form of expression as appropriate or inappropriate unless they
have some basis for the judgment that actions are obligatory, prohibited, or
permissible. It is, therefore, doubtful that virtue ethics can adequately explain
and justify assertions of the rightness or wrongness of actions without resort
to principles and rules.
If we rely, as we should, on character traits such as sympathy and
benevolence for moral motivation, we should also be prepared for our motives
to be partial and in need of correction by impartial moral principles. For
example, we are likely to judge persons more favorably when they are close
to us in intimate relationships. Yet, sometimes those who are distant deserve
to be judged more favorably than we are disposed to judge them. Rather than
precluding impartial principles and rules, virtues sometimes rely on them. In
addition, virtues such as wisdom and discernment involve understanding the
relevance of principles and rules in a variety of circumstances. Principles and
virtues are, in this respect, similar. They require attention and sensitivity
attuned to the demands of a particular context. Respect for autonomy and
beneficence will be as varied in different contexts as compassion and
discernment. The ways in which health professionals manifest these principles
and virtues in the care of patients will be as different as the ways in which
devoted parents care for their children.
Many virtues dispose persons to act in accordance with principles and rules,
and a person's virtuous character is often found in a practical understanding
of how to employ a principle in a particular case. Understanding what needs
23. See David Solomon, Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics, 13 MIDWEST STUDIES PHIL. 428,439
(1988).
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to be done for patients, understanding how to do it, and then responding with
sensitivity and caring are moral qualities of character; they are not merely
forms of practical intelligence and judgment. These forms of caring sometimes
open up discerning insights into what is at stake, what counts the most, and
what needs to be done. At the same time, even a virtue such as moral
integrity, which accommodates a wide variety of moral beliefs, is often
principled. I would argue that moral integrity in science, medicine, and health
care should be understood predominately in terms of principles and rules that
can be identified in the common morality and in the traditions of health care.
A vital aspect of moral integrity is faithfulness to these norms, and the person
who violates them is likely to be rejected as a person without moral integrity.
Many other virtues, such as conscientiousness, could be similarly treated in
terms of a serious commitment to follow principles and rules.
Finally, it deserves notice that some areas of the moral life are not readily
frameable or interpretable in the language of virtue theory. Committee review
in hospitals and research centers provides a typical case in contemporary
bioethics. When strangers meet in professional settings, character judgments
will often play a less significant role than norms that express rights and
appropriate procedures. The same is true in the enforcement of institutional
rules and in framing public policy. Virtue theory's strong suit is not in these
domains, and dispensing with specified principles and rules of obligation in
these settings would be an unwarranted loss in the moral life.
C. Dartmouth Descriptivism and the Critique of Principlism
Not everyone who accepts norms of obligation agrees that principles
provide the best framework for health care ethics. The self-described
Dartmouth Descriptivists, K. Danner Clouser, Bernard Gert, and Ronald
Green, are critics of this description. They refer to the account Childress and
I have developed as "principlism" and reject it as inadequate.24 Clouser and
Gert bring the following accusations against systems of general principles: 1)
principles are little more than checklists or headings for values and have no
deep moral substance that can guide practice in the way moral rules do; 2)
principle-analyses fail to provide a theory of justification or a theory that ties
the principles together, with the consequence that principles are ad hoe
constructions lacking systematic order; and 3) prima facie principles often
compete in difficult circumstances, yet the underlying philosophical theory is
too weak both to decide how to adjudicate the conflict in particular cases and
to deal theoretically with the problem of a conflict of principles.
I agree that these problems are worthy of careful and sustained reflection
in moral theory. I doubt, however, that the Dartmouth Descriptivists have
24. See Danner K. Clouser & Bernard Gert, A Critique of Principlism, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 219-36
(1990); Ronald M. Green et al., The Method of Public Morality Versus the Method of Principlism, 18
J. MED. & PHIL. (1993). A diverse, but less focused set of criticisms is found in RON P. HAMEL ET AL.,
BEYOND PRINCIPLISM (1993).
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surmounted the problems they lay at the door of principle-based approaches.
The primary difference between what Childress and I call principles and what
they call rules is that their rules tend (as they note) to have a more directive
and specific content than our principles, thereby seeming, superficially, to
give more guidance in the moral life. But we have pointed out this same fact
since our 1979 first edition. We have always insisted that specific rules, not
mere unspecified principles, are essential for health care ethics.
Also, there is neither more nor less normative content in their rules than
ours, and neither more nor less direction in the moral life. It is true that
principles function to order and to classify as much as to give prescriptive
guidance, and therefore principles do serve a labelling and organizing
function. However, this feature only indicates again that principles are abstract
starting points in need of additional specification. Moreover, Clouser and Gert
mistakenly suggest that principles sort and classify rather than offer normative
guidance. Logically, the function of principles is to guide conduct, and, in
cases free of conflicting obligations we often do not need more specific rules.
But principles are not stateable with an eye to eliminating the many possible
conflicts among principles, because no system of guidelines (principles or
rules) could reasonably anticipate the full range of conflicts or provide
mechanical solutions for moral problems.
The major difference between our theory and Dartmouth Descriptivism
seems to have nothing to do with whether principles or rules are primary or
secondary normative guides in a theory, but rather lies within several aspects
of their theory that I would reject. First, they assume that there is, or at least
can be, what they call a "well-developed unified theory" that removes
conflicting principles and consistently expresses the grounds of correct
judgment-in effect, a canon of rules and theory that expresses the "unity and
universality of morality." They fault us heavily for believing that more than
one kind of ethical theory can justify a moral belief and insist that we must
do the theoretical work of showing the basis of principles. They insist that to
avoid relativism there can only be "a single unified ethical theory," and that
there cannot be "several sources of final justification. '2 I reject each of
these claims, but at the same time I recognize them as reasonable philosophi-
cal requests for further argument. They would require a more searching
examination than I have undertaken here.
III. CONCLUSION
I have argued that the moral universe should not be divided into rival and
incompatible theories that are principle-based, virtue-based, rights-based, case-
based, rule-based, etc. We often coherently fuse appeals to principles, rules,
virtues, analogies, precedents, and parables. To assign priority to one
paradigm of biomedical ethics is a suspicious project; and I have not
25. Clouser & Gert, supra note 24, at 231-32; Ronald M. Green, Method in Bioethics: A Troubled
Assessment, 15 J. MED. & PHIL. 179-97 (1990).
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attempted to argue that the principles paradigm is somehow more serious or
more worthy than other paradigms. Even theories with a single ultimate
principle, such as utilitarianism and Kantianism, deserve careful attention for
what they can teach us about moral reasoning and moral theory. The more
general (principles, rules, theories, etc.) and the more particular (feelings,
perceptions, case judgments, practices, parables, etc.) should be* coherently
united in the moral life and in moral philosophy, not ripped from their natural
habitat and segregated into distinct and rival species.
A careful analysis and specification of principles is consistent with a wide
variety of types of ethical theory, including virtue theory and some accounts
that came to prominence only recently, such as communitarian theories,
casuistical theories, and the ethics of care. Many authors in biomedical ethics
mistakenly address the field as if a principle-based approach is a one-sided,
exclusionary, and even tyrannical approach to bioethics. At the same time, the
principles paradigm must address the fact that principles are initially attractive
because they offer an impartial instrument to resolve our moral dilemmas, but
in concrete circumstances conflicts among the principles often generate
dilemmas rather than resolving them. A defender of principles will be grateful
for help from any resource that can blunt or reduce intractable dilemmas.
Every reasonable, insightful, and useful strategy is one we can ill afford to
reject if we are to successfully handle the diverse set of issues needing
treatment in contemporary bioethics.
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